2017/07/25 by Nancy Kendrick · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Religion, Gender, and Enlightenment #Reformation and Early Modern Christianity #French Literature and Criticism #Friendship #Virtue #Reciprocity (cultural anthropology) #Metaphysics #Philosophy #Epistemology #Sociology #Social psychology #Psychology
paper · doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1347869
openalex publication_date 2017/07/25 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/02
Mary Astell’s theory of friendship has been interpreted either as a version of Aristotelian virtue friendship, or as aligned with a Christian and Platonist tradition. In this paper, I argue that Astell’s theory of friendship is determinedly anti-Aristotelian; it is a theory of spiritual friendship offered as an alternative to Aristotelian virtue friendship. By grounding her conception of friendship in a Christian–Platonist metaphysics, I show that Astell rejects the Aristotelian criteria of reciprocity and partiality as essential features of the friendship bond and that she develops a theory of friendship that is neither reciprocal nor partial. Further, I argue that Astell’s theory of friendship advances her feminist aims by providing a justification for female–female spiritual bonds in contradistinction to female–male marriage bonds. Astell argues that the female–female bond of spiritual friendship is sanctioned by God, and is, therefore, a divinely authorized alternative to the male–female bond of marriage. Through her theory of spiritual friendship, Astell marks out a central place for female–female bonds and provides women with a justification for resisting marriage.