2016/09/22 by Daniel K. Lapsley · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Psychology · Neuroscience · #Social and Intergroup Psychology #Cultural Differences and Values #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Social cognitive theory of morality #Identity (music) #Situationism #Moral disengagement #Social identity theory #Social identity approach #Epistemology #Social psychology #Personal identity #Warrant #Moral psychology #Psychology #Context (archaeology) #Moral agency #Sociology #Moral development #Social group #Self #Aesthetics #Philosophy
paper · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190271466.003.0003
openalex publication_date 2016/09/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
This chapter describes a social-cognitive theory of moral identity. It trades on important themes in ethical theory that emphasize the importance of second-order desires and strong evaluation. After placing moral identity within a historical context of moral development research, and describing Blasi’s pioneering work in reaction to it, the chapter outlines the key elements of the social-cognitive alternative that emphasizes the accessibility and centrality of moral identity within the working self-concept, and the role of situations in activating or deactivating its accessibility. The empirical warrant for this approach is reviewed. A claim is made that social-cognitive moral identity theory is a progressive research program and has implications for current debates about situationism and the stability of moral dispositions.