2003/09/01 by Michael Kenney · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Engineering · #Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies #Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence #Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance #Terrorism #Interdiction #Victory #Politics #Government (linguistics) #Political science #Political economy #Law #Public relations #Economics #Engineering
paper · doi:10.1080/00396338.2003.9688585
openalex publication_date 2003/09/01 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
In wars on drugs and terrorism, states confront daunting adversaries: transnational networks of criminals and terrorists that carry out illegal activities, while avoiding government efforts to destroy them. These illicit enterprises share numerous similarities, including compartmentalised structures, flat decision-making hierarchies and an aptitude for organisational adaptation. While the US and its counter-terrorism partners have achieved substantial results against al-Qaeda, similarities among traffickers and terrorists, and lessons from two decades of war on drugs suggest a number of difficulties in dismantling terrorist networks. If policymakers hope to achieve lasting victory in the war on terror, they must move beyond a strategy based on leadership interdiction and devote greater diplomatic, political, and economic resources to addressing the 'demand side' of terrorism.