2017/01/01 by Chris Letheby, Philip Gerrans · 4 citations
Psychology · Chemistry · #Psychedelics and Drug Studies #Chemical synthesis and alkaloids #Id, ego and super-ego #Self #Psychology #Representation (politics) #Cognition #Narrative #Function (biology) #Psychology of self #Cognitive psychology #Mental representation #Social psychology #Cognitive science
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/nc/nix016
openalex publication_date 2017/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or 'I' distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such 'ego dissolution' experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the 'integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist.