1978/10/01 by Lorraine M. Lees · 13 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Balkan and Eastern European Studies #Balkans: History, Politics, Society #Eastern European Communism and Reforms #Soviet union #Administration (probate law) #Politics #Political science #Cold war #World War II #Economic history #Political economy #Law #History #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1978.tb00445.x
published in Diplomatic History 2(4), 407-422 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 1978/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Throughout the 1940s, Eastern Europe represented one of the most persistent sources of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Second World War ended, American policymakers realized that the Soviet Union would dominate the governments of Eastern Europe for some time to come. Yet they hoped that the United States would be able to penetrate and liberalize the area's regimes through the application of economic and diplomatic pressure. Little resulted from this strategy. In 1948, however, Josef Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, acting independently, shattered the Soviet bloc from within by splitting with Stalin. Though anxious for just such an occurrence, the Truman administration reacted with caution and did not establish economic or political ties with Tito until 1949. The evolution of American policy toward Tito after the break, as well as the decision to assist him in his struggle with Stalin, reveal significant aspects of the cold war philosophy of the Truman administration.