2003/12/01 by David Leblang, Steve Chan · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Comparative politics #Corporate governance #Democracy #Democratic governance #Economics #Epistemology #Extant taxon #Government (linguistics) #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Law #Law and economics #Legislature #Peacebuilding and International Security #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Positive economics #Presidential system #Proposition #Representation (politics) #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1177/106591290305600401
openalex publication_date 2003/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Extant research has shown that cross-national variations in the level of a country ’s democracy tend to be related to its propensity to be involved in external conflict. The dyadic version of the theory of democratic peace contends that democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other, and it is strongly supported by the available evidence. The monadic version, suggesting that democracies are in general more peaceful regardless of the nature of the other party involved in a relationship, has been less well supported. This article addresses the latter proposition, seeking to explain the variations in war involvement among the established democracies on the basis of major differences in their institutions of governance. Among the various distinctions considered (such as parliamentary versus presidential forms of government, rule by a single dominant party versus a coalition government, and phases of the electoral cycle), a country ’s electoral system turns out to be the most important institutional factor that dampens war involvement. Established democracies with a proportionate - representation system tend to have significantly less such involvement according to three alternative measures. We adduce insights from comparative studies of democratic politics to explain this major finding, thereby offering a more specific and cogent account of why this particular institutional arrangement matters for external belligerence.