2010/03/01 by Alexander Stroh · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Political Conflict and Governance #Cambodian History and Society #International Development and Aid #Authoritarianism #Opposition (politics) #Proportional representation #Democracy #Politics #Accountability #Political economy #Constitution #Representation (politics) #Electoral system #Local government #Political science #Public administration #Sociology #Law
paper · doi:10.1080/17531050903550066
openalex publication_date 2010/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Much has been written about the special design of Rwanda's judiciary in order to handle the aftermath of the genocide in 1994. By contrast, other institutional elements of the 2003 constitution have rarely been addressed in research. The second (partial) parliamentary elections in September 2008 revealed some of the implications which the carefully designed electoral system has for Rwanda's political development. As a starting point, the paper emphasises the need to link the debate about institutional design in divided societies with the debate about elections in authoritarian regimes. Under different regime types, “institutional engineers” may pursue different goals. The paper argues that proportional representation (PR) can foster undemocratic outcomes: PR impedes the local accountability of politicians in a political environment in which the government is not held in check by a democratic opposition. Thus, the current PR system facilitates the maintenance of authoritarian power in Rwanda whereas small constituencies would establish closer links between the local populations and their representatives.