2007/03/01 by Antonio Giustozzi · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Medicine · #Military History and Strategy #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Intelligence, Security, War Strategy #Afghan #Attrition #Insurgency #Political science #Operational level of war #Law #Politics #Spanish Civil War #Medicine
paper · doi:10.1080/09592310601173220
openalex publication_date 2007/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army.