1985/12/01 by Andreas Diekmann · 500 citations
Decision Sciences · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Dilemma #Economics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Free riding #Game Theory and Applications #Game theory #Incentive #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Microeconomics #Production (economics) #Property (philosophy) #Prosocial behavior #Psychology #Public good #Social dilemma #Social psychology #Stochastic game #Strategy
paper · doi:10.1177/0022002785029004003
published in Journal of Conflict Resolution 29(4), 605-610 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 1985/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
A conflict game simulating social traps in which a collective good can be provided by a volunteer is discussed and some solution concepts are analyzed. There is a greater incentive for “free riding” than for the production of the collective good at the cost of the volunteer. However, if everybody defects, all players will lose. Such a result is frequently produced by “diffusion of responsibility” as described by Darley and Latané (1968). In contrast to other social traps, a dominant strategy does not exist. Also, the mixed-equilibrium strategy yields very low payoffs. The expected gain is not greater than the payoff achieved by the nonequilibrium maximum strategy. Superrationality might be a way out of the trap. However, this concept lacks the desirable equilibrium property. Only in the free communication version of the game can a definitive answer to the question of a rational strategy be given.