1998/05/01 by David de Meza, Benjamin Lockwood · 2 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Finance and Governance #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems #Financial Reporting and Valuation Research #Business #Property rights #Asset (computer security) #Property (philosophy) #Theory of the firm #Finance #Accounting #Law and economics #Microeconomics #Industrial organization #Economics #Computer science
paper · doi:10.1162/003355398555621
openalex publication_date 1998/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/26
This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) “property rights” approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.