2017/12/04 by David H. Ucko · 28 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Military History and Strategy #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Defense, Military, and Policy Studies #Negotiation #Political science #Politics #Doctrine #Elite #Leverage (statistics) #Military doctrine #Law #Political economy #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1406852
published in Journal of Strategic Studies 42(3-4), 448-479 (Taylor & Francis)
openalex publication_date 2017/12/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2025/11/06
Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.