2015/09/22 by Curtis Bell, Jun Koga Sudduth · 82 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Defense, Military, and Policy Studies #Development economics #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Face (sociological concept) #Government (linguistics) #Law #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Social science #Sociology #Spanish Civil War #State (computer science) #Welfare
paper · doi:10.1177/0022002715603098
published in Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(7), 1432-1455 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2015/09/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Though approximately one in four coup attempts takes place during an ongoing civil war, scholars have not yet analyzed how the incidence of civil war affects coup attempts and outcomes. We conduct the first empirical analysis of the relationship between ongoing civil war and coup activity, finding (1) war increases the risk of a coup attempt, though (2) war-time coup attempts are significantly less likely to be successful, and (3) the risk of war-time coup is much higher when states face stronger rebel groups that pose greater threats to the political survival of the incumbent government. We attribute these findings to the pernicious effect of ongoing war on the welfare of the military elites and soldiers who have the greatest capacity to execute a coup attempt. As war diminishes their welfare and creates uncertainty about the future of the state, potential plotters become more willing to accept riskier coup attempts than they might plot during peace-time. Coup motivations are greatest when incumbents are more likely to lose their wars, and this causes coup plotters to attempt more and riskier coups when rebels are relatively strong.