2020/07/01 by Johan Hietanen, Petri Turunen, Ilmari Hirvonen +3 · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Philosophy and History of Science #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies #Scientism #Epistemology #Opportunism #Natural science #Dilemma #Natural (archaeology) #Philosophy #Sociology #Political science #Law
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/meta.12443
openalex publication_date 2020/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.