2001/01/01 by Reuven Shapira · 1 citation
Business, Management and Accounting · #Cooperative Studies and Economics #Wine Industry and Tourism #Management and Organizational Studies #Oligarchy #Morality #Democracy #Sociology #Conservatism #Organizational culture #Law #Political science #Public relations
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1475-682x.2001.tb00926.x
openalex publication_date 2001/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
What is the connection between leaders’morality and the output performance of organizations? Can their morality explain, through trust, continuity, and change of organizational cultures? Is periodic rotation of managers the right solution for the distrust caused by self‐serving conservatism due to Michels's “Iron Law of Oligarchy”? An anthropological study of kibbutzim, whose innovative and adaptive cultures declined recently, found that past success was dependent on high‐moral servant leaders who backed democracy and promoted high‐trust cultures that engendered innovation by creative officers in some kibbutzim, which others imitated. However, conservatism of continuous leaders as heads of low‐trust kibbutz federative organizations, which were ignored by customary kibbutz research, engendered oligarchization which rotation enhanced rather than prevented. However, creativity deteriorated only after decades of growing oligarchy, with the vanishing of the high‐moral old guard. Thus, the crux of democratic communal culture sustainability is pinpointed in the superiority of trusted, high‐moral leaders. A preliminary idea for achieving that aim, predicated on officers’continuation in office being conditional on periodic tests of trust, is herein presented.