2005/04/01 by George Tsebelis, Eduardo Alemán · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Politics and Society in Latin America #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Presidential system #Veto #Latin Americans #Legislature #Political science #Voting #Power (physics) #Public administration #Political economy #Law and economics #Economics #Law #Politics
paper · doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0005
openalex publication_date 2005/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power significantly increases presidential weight in legislative decision making.