2020/11/17 by Valeria Palanza, Gisela Sin · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #American Constitutional Law and Politics #Legal and Constitutional Studies #Political Systems and Governance #Veto #Legislature #Presidential system #Political science #Law and economics #Power (physics) #Separation of powers #Law #Economics #Politics
paper · doi:10.4337/9781789906516.00030
openalex publication_date 2020/11/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
This chapter is concerned with the veto power that chief executives wield over the legislative process. Along with proposal power, the veto is the main tool that executives have as legislators. In its most traditional forms, it allows presidents to block Congress, but it does not enable them to substitute the bills with their own preferences. Depending on the country, presidents may have additional roles in the legislative arena like introducing bills, calling legislatures for special or extraordinary sessions, or issuing decrees that have the power of laws. We look into veto power broadly, beyond presidential systems, which is where they are most common, and where most of the literature has developed. We also pay attention to different types of vetoes because the literature has shown that they vary in their effects and implications. In separation-of-powers systems, and in its simplest form, veto power works as follows: once the legislature passes a bill, the president decides whether she will sign it or issue a veto. If she signs, the bill becomes law. If she vetoes instead, the bill returns to Congress (to both chambers if there are two), where legislators can override the veto. If both chambers override the veto with a certain majority, the bill becomes law. The type of majority needed to override a veto varies and could be, for example, a simple majority, three-fifths, or two-thirds of the legislators. In some countries, if the legislature adjourns before the president decides on a bill (i.e., signs or vetoes it), the president pocket vetoes the bill by not taking any action (this is the case of the United States, for example). Pocket vetoes cannot be overridden. In other countries, however, presidential inaction turns the bill into law (Alemán and Schwartz 2006).