2009/03/01 by Sylvain Brouard · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #European and International Law Studies #Political Systems and Governance #Veto #Legislature #Politics #Incentive #Political science #Competition (biology) #Constitution #Law and economics #Constitutional economics #Economics #Law #Political economy #Market economy
paper · doi:10.1080/01402380802670719
openalex publication_date 2009/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support existing theories of veto politics. Therefore, the article develops an electoral theory of veto politics. It emphasises the fact that the incentives generated by electoral competition shape the signalling game between legislative majority, legislative minority and the Constitutional Council. The structure of this game fuels a high level of vetoes and explains the pattern of vetoing in France.