2017/01/10 by Tim Stevens · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Computer Science · #Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies #Information and Cyber Security #Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies #Corporate governance #Global governance #Politics #Toolbox #Offensive #Political science #Cybercrime #Internet governance #Architecture #Fragmentation (computing) #Political economy #Public relations #Law and economics #Law #Sociology #The Internet #Computer science #Economics #Management
paper · pdf · doi:10.1057/palcomms.2016.102
openalex publication_date 2017/01/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Abstract Cyberweapons are a relatively new addition to the toolbox of contemporary conflict but have the potential to destabilize international relations. Since Stuxnet (a malicious computer worm) in 2010 demonstrated how computer code could be weaponised to generate political effect, cyberweapons have increasingly been discussed in terms of potential regulation and prohibition. Most analyses focus on how global institutions and regimes might be developed to regulate the development and use of cyberweapons and identify the political and technical obstacles to fulfilling this ambition. This focus on centralized authority obscures identification of existing governance efforts in this field, which together constitute an emerging global governance architecture for offensive cyber capabilities. This article explores three sources of cyberweapons governance—cyberwarfare, cybercrime and export controls on dual-use technologies—and briefly describes their political dynamics and prospects. It is argued that although fragmented, the global governance of cyberweapons should not be dismissed on this basis. Fragmentation is a condition of global governance, not its antithesis, and policy should respect this fragmentation instead of regarding it as an impediment to further development of cyberweapons governance. This article is published as part of a collection on global governance.