2012/03/28 by Alexander Glaser, R.J. Goldston · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Engineering · #Nuclear Issues and Defense #Fissile material #Breakout #USable #Covert #Production (economics) #Nuclear engineering #Nuclear decommissioning #Fusion #Computer science #Risk analysis (engineering) #Computer security #Business #Engineering #Nuclear physics #Physics #Finance #Neutron #Economics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1088/0029-5515/52/4/043004
openalex publication_date 2012/03/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to weapon-usable materials can be divided into three main categories: (1) clandestine production of weapon-usable material in an undeclared facility, (2) covert production of such material in a declared facility and (3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper, we address each of these categories of risks from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if the fusion system is designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards.