2009/08/22 by John Roberts · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · Mathematics · Chemistry · #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Metaphysics #Essentialism #Philosophy #Epistemology #Character (mathematics) #Natural law #Doctrine #Natural (archaeology) #Modal #Mathematics #History #Theology #Chemistry
paper · doi:10.1080/00048400903159016
openalex publication_date 2009/08/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Laws of nature are puzzling because they have a ‘modal character’—they seem to be ‘necessary-ish’—even though they also seem to be metaphysically contingent. And it is hard to understand how contingent truths could have such a modal character. Scientific essentialism is a doctrine that seems to dissolve this puzzle, by showing that laws of nature are actually metaphysically necessary. I argue that even if the metaphysics of natural kinds and properties offered by scientific essentialism is correct, there are still some metaphysically contingent truths that share the modal character of the laws of nature. I argue that these contingent truths should be considered laws of nature. So even if scientific essentialism is true, at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent.