2024/08/21 by Nadiia Koval, Milada Anna Vachudová, Milada Anna Vachudova · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #European Union Policy and Governance #European Politics and Security #European and International Law Studies
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/jcms.13677
When faced with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Ukraine's steadfast resistance, the European Union (EU) reacted with remarkable speed and innovation. In a few short months, it offered novel forms of financial and military support to Ukraine, along with the revival of EU enlargement and the recognition of Ukraine as a credible future EU candidate.1 Two years later, in June 2024, the EU opened membership negotiations with Ukraine. This marked a tremendous change of fortune for Ukraine's long, deeply held and hard-fought aspirations to join the EU. But this change came at the price of a brutal, devastating, full-scale war with Russia. Still, for Ukrainians, whilst US and European military and financial assistance are both essential for prosecuting the war, it is the EU that symbolizes, even embodies, the values and goals that they are fighting for (Hrushetskyi, 2023; Onuch, 2024; Popova and Shevel, 2023; Reznik, 2022).2 In responding to the war, the EU has shown both its promise as a geopolitical actor and its severe limitations. It has set the stage for the revival of EU enlargement as an important pillar of its ability to promote EU values, project geopolitical power and build its economic wealth (Michel, 2024; Vachudova, 2005). We argue that linking Ukraine's enlargement prospects, its ability to fight off the Russian invasion and the EU's future as a geopolitical actor has opened a new chapter in European integration. However, after impressive co-operation in 2022, EU leaders pulled back in 2023 and have been unable to meet the demands of the war by increasing defence capacities and reforming decision-making in the areas of enlargement and security (Börzel, 2023; Raik et al., 2023). The EU's sudden recognition of Ukraine as a future candidate reflected the EU's prior experiences of using enlargement as a foreign policy tool (Vachudova, 2014). In this article, we first unpack the dynamics of the EU's ambitious post-communist enlargements and explore how they are shaping the war-triggered revival of the enlargement process for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as for longstanding candidates in the Western Balkans. For the third time, it is an external shock – and, for the second time, war – that is spurring enlargement. We show that enlargement is once again coming into conflict with EU producers and challenging the EU to manage short-term economic interests in pursuit of its long-term security (Rabinovych and Pintsch, 2024). The EU is also confronted by the imperative of defending liberal democracy and the rule of law amongst its existing members and candidates. Second, we show that whilst the EU's initial response to the war was driven by crisis leadership on the part of the European Commission, the limitations of this crisis leadership, the absence of Franco–German leadership and a shift towards ad hoc member state coalitions have hobbled the EU's response in 2023 and in 2024. For the EU, the collapse of communist rule across East Central Europe caused an ‘enlargement shock’ (Vachudova, 2007). The EU had developed since World War II in a divided Europe where the Iron Curtain made Central and Eastern Europe all but invisible to Brussels. Suddenly, there was potentially a very long queue of post-communist states that were incontestably in Europe and could not be turned away for reasons of geography. Whilst some opposition leaders called for joining the EU before the communist regimes had even fallen, it took years for the EU to respond by putting a full-scale enlargement process in place. Some EU leaders rejected, and many stalled giving post-communist neighbours what they wanted: the prospect of joining the EU (Vachudova, 2005). As they do today, some EU leaders tried to keep these newly democratizing states at bay; famously, French President François Mitterrand advocated for a ‘European Confederation’ that would have relegated Central and East European States to an outer circle with lower status than the EU core (Bozo, 2008). The way that the EU had developed since the 1950s made it invaluable for small and weak states to be on the inside, not the outside, of the EU's highly protectionist common internal market. In tandem, it would be very advantageous for small and weak states to gain a seat at the EU table and be protected by the rules that regulate behaviour amongst EU member states. For aspiring members, the economic and geopolitical benefits of gaining EU membership were and are tremendous. And for the EU, an enlarged membership promised a greater geopolitical role on the world stage, economic opportunities in a larger internal market and stable states along its eastern borders (Michel, 2024; Vachudova, 2005). In the early 1990s, however, the EU acted to protect its producers, not to support stability and democracy in neighbouring states. The European Commission negotiated ungenerous initial trade agreements, the so-called ‘Europe Agreements’, that required the EU's democratizing neighbours to open completely their markets to EU goods but did not reciprocate in precisely those areas where post-communist states could hope to compete: agriculture, chemicals, steel and textiles. In 2023 and 2024, we see EU institutions trying to help Ukraine's war-torn economy with access to EU markets, but once again, there is strong pressure to protect EU producers in key sectors. By the late 1990s, what had been separate – enlargement and foreign policy – was brought together as leaders realized that the EU's most effective foreign policy tool was indeed enlargement (Vachudova, 2005). As negotiations progressed with 10 post-communist candidates, EU leaders were bullish, riding high from the success of completing the internal market in 1992 and other leaps forward in integration during the 1990s. The EU pledged to use the power of enlargement to transform the Western Balkans, opening a new chapter after a shameful decade of failure in the region. Western Balkan states were offered a membership perspective for the first time in Sarajevo in 1999 as part of the stability pact for South-Eastern Europe, followed by access to the internal market and membership negotiations. Yet after Croatia joined in 2013, the enlargement process all but ended for a decade. What are the dynamics of EU enlargement today in the face of Russia's war? There are four points. First, the benefits of EU membership that give the EU passive leverage – and, potentially, tremendous active leverage over candidate states (Vachudova, 2005) – have remained strong despite the ebbs and flows of European integration in the face of the crises that have challenged European politics since 2008. The disastrous consequences of Brexit for the United Kingdom have driven home the economic benefits of EU membership (Epstein, 2019), a point well received even by the EU's far-right parties that have all but stopped advocating for an EU exit. Whilst the EU has become more adept at granting access to the internal market in pursuit of foreign policy goals, the economic benefits of joining the EU's internal market are still enormous (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018), and, for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the geopolitical benefits are even greater. Second, enlargement and the EU's geopolitical power continue to be spurred by external shocks. In 1999 and 2022, the EU reached for enlargement in response to the war in its neighbourhood. In both cases, the EU granted struggling countries recognition as credible candidates for membership. And in both cases, the membership perspective came after grave missteps by the EU – in clinging to negotiations with Serbian leaders to end the war in Bosnia from 1991 to 1994 and in profiting from the flow of cheap energy from the Kremlin even after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine by Russia in 2014. Third, whilst EU enlargement is now heralded widely as the EU's most powerful foreign policy tool (European Parliament, 2022), it still harbours weaknesses stemming from the longtime primary function of EU institutions as architects and caretakers of the internal market (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018). EU enlargement helps promote democratic reforms because the benefits of membership create incentives for ruling elites in candidate states to adopt and implement the rules and regulations in force amongst EU member states – the acquis communautaire (see Sedelmeier, 2011). Although stipulated in broad terms in EU treaties, member states have agreed on a little more specific ‘acquis’ on liberal democracy, including the rule of law and democratic representation, for candidates to adopt. As EU integration is often deepened through crises (Laffan, 2023), it is possible that the trifecta of rising far-right parties across Europe, authoritarian rule in Hungary and military aggression by Russia will spur change in developing this missing ‘democracy acquis’. Fourth, there are now strong forces that may overcome the roadblocks that immobilized EU enlargement for Western Balkan candidates in the 2010s. On the side of the EU, disinterest, petty regional politics and a preference for stability at any cost destroyed the effectiveness of conditionality, and the meritocracy of the process was extinguished (Džankić et al., 2019). On the side of the candidates, whilst all Western Balkan governments continue to pay lip service to joining the EU, some have been captured by domestic elites that benefit from the status quo (Bieber, 2020) and that seek closer ties to Russia and China (Zeneli, 2020). For both sides, Ukraine as an EU candidate may be a game changer (Džankić et al., 2023). For the EU, there are now compelling geopolitical reasons to end regional political games and revive a meritocratic process. For the candidates, Ukraine's resolve to break the non-enlargement status quo may be invigorating. Once Ukraine seemed to survive the first few days of the invasion, it applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022. In this dramatic move, Ukraine explicitly linked its struggle to survive to becoming an EU member. The initial reactions of EU leaders were reserved, aiming to decouple discussions of future membership from the emergency of the war (RFI, 2022). But in less than a month, EU leaders accepted the logic of the interconnectedness of Ukraine's enlargement prospects, its ability to fight off the Russian invasion and the EU's future as a security actor. For EU leaders and EU institutions, this decision was taken at lightning speed and made crystal clear the strong geopolitical implications of enlargement, hidden in plain sight for years. Indeed, the states whose presidents signed a letter in favour of Ukraine's swift candidacy in February 2022 (Oficjalna strona, 2022) also provided the greatest amount of aid to Ukraine as a percentage of their GDP during the first year of Russia's full-scale war.3 Meanwhile, the most pronounced sceptics of Ukraine's EU perspective have vocally supported ending the war on Russian terms, as evinced by Hungary and, more recently, by Slovakia (Pollet, 2024; see Haughton et al., 2024). Has Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine led to deeper European integration? Scholars have argued that the EU has the potential to become a powerful geopolitical actor, even a superpower, if member states decide to strengthen supranational decision-making in foreign policy and defence (Meunier and Vachudova, 2018). In this way, they could build on the EU's undisputed power in trade, where member states have transferred competencies to EU institutions and abandoned the need for unanimity in the Council. Scholars have also pointed to the crisis as a frequent driver of breakthroughs in European integration (Jones et al., 2021). In the first months of the war, as EU leaders implemented significant and unprecedented measures in the areas of enlargement and security, some scholars expressed optimism about the EU's growing power (Håkansson, 2024; Laffan, 2023; Orenstein, 2023). Two years on, others have observed that the war has so far not empowered EU institutions in a durable way, strengthening instead intergovernmental decision-making – in contrast, for instance, with the effects of the COVID crisis (Anghel and Jones, 2023; Börzel, 2023; Genschel et al., 2023). Moreover, the war has so far not changed the nature of enlargement policy, leaving the commitment to enlargement questionable (Anghel and Džankić, 2023). We turn now to three dynamics that have challenged the EU's enlargement and security agenda in the face of war: the limitations of crisis leadership by the EU's supranational institutions, the absence of Franco–German leadership and the prevalence of ad hoc member state coalitions. Supranational theories of European integration suggest that in times of crisis, the EU's supranational institutions assume new responsibilities for themselves through agenda-setting and political and institutional spillover (Leuffen et al., 2022, pp. 98–100). Since 2022, the European Commission, under the leadership of President von der Leyen, has significantly expanded its geopolitical influence and aspirations (Håkansson, 2024). The Commission's role in the enlargement agenda, in military support for Ukraine and in developing the EU's internal defence capacity increased dramatically and helped push through important decisions, often in co-operation with the European External Action Service (EEAS). During the first days of Russia's attack on Ukraine, in March 2022, the Commission played a critical role in implementing the first packages of sanctions (that totalled 13 packages by spring 2024), introducing the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainian refugees and repurposing the European Peace Facility (EPF) to aid Ukraine's military effort – the first time that the EU would finance and purchase weapons for a country under attack. In April, the Commission ensured the swift exchange of enlargement questionnaires, thus greatly contributing to the rapid conferral of Ukraine's candidate status. In May, the Commission announced the removal of quotas for Ukrainian agricultural exports and plans to decrease dependency on Russian fuel (REPowerEU). In June, the Commission announced Solidarity Lanes, and in July, it proposed a €50 million European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common 2022 how the Commission the after the of the war and expanded its into new In the Commission to long-term in the Commission its (European Commission, that opening negotiations with Ukraine and granting candidate status to and negotiations with Bosnia and In April, the Commission quotas and trade with Ukraine to support its and in July, it the Ukraine a financial support In the security the Commission a project of for Ukraine the in of it the European Defence Industry to the EU's defence through with the of the European Defence Industry (European Commission, 2024; see 2023). over the of the leadership and of the Commission and its ambitious President because the Commission's new competencies that for and integration were not whilst the Commission could and push in enlargement policy, sanctions policy, energy policy and even foreign and security policy, their and on unanimity amongst the member states in the Council. Whilst the increased the financial in March and June and again in March to help Ukraine, it was in the that Hungary to some Moreover, instead of the Commission's in 2023 and 2024, the even some of the that were the Commission's in and in states neighbouring Ukraine and and of agricultural goods from Ukraine. In a to Ukraine's the a quotas for agricultural in Ukraine is and 2024; 2023). help the of the Commission's ability to push forward the enlargement and security the crisis leadership of the Commission, it is the where most key geopolitical are In months, February and 2022, there were four of the in response to the war, including an European an European a European and the on and March 2022. The of of the in its many have to be by the The key for the that in 2023 and in is its as the Franco–German has stopped In 2022, the absence of Franco–German leadership could be to the shock of the war and the time to longstanding By 2023 and 2024, we see that and are a strong EU For over and economic interests by a whilst the security of EU Russia's to Ukraine as a potential candidate for EU membership even after unprecedented in the pursuit of an and a membership perspective in and Popova and Shevel, 2023). This supported and with Russia in forms that on and the policy of the EU. after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the of the War in EU leaders to Russian aggression by Ukraine to limitations on its in with their economic with Russia et al., 2023). The for and for through were with theories that economic and power 2023). In this however, they helped create a more a Ukraine and a EU and Whilst Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made this way of about economic and security with the Kremlin it has not brought about a of a new security for Europe in and and have common on enlargement and even discussions in 2023 on how and it could 2023). But they have on how to respond to the in 2023 and has followed the US a policy of assistance in the of and a Whilst leadership in the amount of it to Ukraine and through European has many on the the and the of help it to some have it using the to little to 2024). has supported Ukraine's EU but in contrast, has its of the EU's but has greatly on how to In 2022, President first tried to by and a way to face also the European as a for new enlargement and tried to with In 2023 and 2024, has made a it now support to Ukraine's over an enlargement for Ukraine and the of foreign to Ukraine. However, for all of its military and financial support for Ukraine is and are as as in to Ukraine's agricultural and US and with from other EU members, project for But an important towards any of a EU would be for and to on more ambitious for Ukraine the war whilst plans for a of with the and 2024; see also 2023). the leadership and of and 2023 a year of ad hoc coalitions and state On a and their to Ukraine, whilst the and were the first EU states to defence with Ukraine in the first months of 2024. of leadership was the amongst about governments to for this was spurred by the clear failure of the EU's in of to meet its initial goals, including the very effectiveness of the European Defence in the On a more in the to give members to EU support for Ukraine leverage and 2024). Hungary has by use of its In Hungary a letter to for the membership perspective and all but ending assistance to Ukraine. It also many opportunities to EU assistance to Ukraine, as sanctions off sanctions and from the Ukraine Facility and the As the war has the of Hungary has been to use its to from the EU and from Ukraine 2023). Hungary even to the opening of Ukraine's membership negotiations and its in by the As has been by the of a the enlargement process and the of the EU, strong leadership is in the 2022). a more as an EU member that both and the interconnectedness of security and enlargement. Since 2022, has been of the undisputed leaders in military and political assistance to Ukraine and its to EU membership. However, in trying to decouple its political support for Ukraine from protectionist measures to benefit agricultural measures with a on Ukrainian agricultural exports to in in of EU followed Ukrainian agricultural And governments and to the for months, significant economic for Ukraine and 2023). the change in (see Haughton et al., 2024), it is that will to the access of Ukrainian agricultural to the EU market Ukraine's negotiations. Russia's full-scale war and Ukraine's steadfast response may well be a for the with lightning leaders for the EU a role in Ukraine fight the war and in a new European security by way of EU enlargement and rising EU defence We argue that the shock of February was with the EU's and most enlargement and foreign policy response to The EU has the potential to project geopolitical power by European security through enlargement and even as it a geopolitical market to leverage the power of its internal market (see 2023; Orenstein, 2023). In 2023 and 2024, however, we see and amongst member states that have the Commission's crisis leadership and in the absence of Franco–German leadership in the Council. This has a shift towards short-term political even on the part of some of Ukraine's most and enlargement As has many times the interests of domestic producers in the EU are in with the EU's security and the EU to do more to greater for the EU, for Ukraine and for security, however, is the power by an authoritarian the EU that with the Kremlin and to the EU and Vachudova, 2018). As the war more and far-right parties powerful across Europe, the ability and will of EU leaders to push back Hungary through intergovernmental decision-making may and 2024; but see 2023). Meanwhile, the are for internal reforms that would more supranational decision-making to enlargement and defence Hungary other political parties and other forces that the the war, enlargement and a geopolitical of these are for aid to Ukraine and an including of Ukraine of Russian of the plans are often with a enlargement as a for Ukraine's and This is an that will strengthen the of authoritarian European security and the EU's We argue that the EU's future as a geopolitical actor is to the of the war and to the of a enlargement process. the EU the with other and with to Ukraine assistance to the war in with a enlargement Whilst the severe of an war be it may as a Russian military attack on an EU member an even more attack Ukraine, to of and it the war will the EU's ability to as a strong security assistance with the today whilst for the political will for institutional and long-term capacity the EU to as a powerful geopolitical in Russian it its security and its influence in the and the For and we would to and