2014/12/21 by Natasja Reslow, Maarten Vink · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #European Union Policy and Governance #International Development and Aid #Migration, Refugees, and Integration
paper · doi:10.1111/jcms.12233
Abstract In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co‐operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating M ember S tates and third countries. In this paper we develop a three‐level game perspective to explain why M ember S tates and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three‐level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: M ember S tates, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision‐makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed M obility P artnership negotiations between EU M ember S tates, the E uropean C ommission and, respectively, C ape V erde and S enegal.