2017/10/12 by Rémi A. Chou, Chou, Remi A., Aylin Yener +1 · 1 citation
Engineering · #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Wireless Communication Security Techniques
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1710.04643
openalex publication_date 2017/10/12 · openalex created_date 2022/10/06 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper considers secret-key generation between several agents and a base\nstation that observe independent and identically distributed realizations of\ncorrelated random variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possible\nindividual key with the base station by means of public communication. All keys\nmust be jointly kept secret from all external entities. In this many-to-one\nsecret-key generation setting, it can be shown that the agents can take\nadvantage of a collective protocol to increase the sum-rate of their generated\nkeys. However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its own\nsecret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate in a collective\nprotocol. Furthermore, when such a collective protocol is employed, how to\nfairly allocate individual key rates arises as a valid issue. This paper\nstudies this tension between cooperation and self-interest with a\ngame-theoretic treatment. The work establishes that cooperation is in the best\ninterest of all individualistic agents and that there exists individual\nsecret-key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the protocol.\nAdditionally, an explicit coding scheme that achieves such allocations is\nproposed.\n