Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

2015/12/31 by Hsien-Pu Chen, Muneer Mohammad, Laszlo B. Kish · 2 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #cs.CR #cs.ET #physics.class-ph

paper · pdf

published as Metrology and Measurement Systems, Vol. 23 (2016), No. 2, pp. 173-181

arxiv created 2016/04/01 · arxiv updated 2016/06/03

Abstract

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security.

Cited by

• A Binary Classifier-Based Wire Resistance Attack on the KLJN Secure Key Exchanger
• Binary Classifier Wire-Resistance Attack on KLJN: Impact of Narrowing the Resistor Gap

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