2013/02/14 by Vojin Rakić · 1 citation
Neuroscience · Social Sciences · #Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy
paper · doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100700
openalex publication_date 2013/02/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement (a conception they used to promote), proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement.