2017/12/07 by Justin De Benedictis-Kessner · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Media Influence and Politics #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
paper · doi:10.1086/694396
openalex publication_date 2017/12/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/13
Democratic accountability relies on the ability of citizens to reward and punish politicians in elections. Electoral institutions, such as the timing of elections, may play a powerful role in this process. In this article, I assess how on-cycle (concurrent) and off-cycle elections affect one facet of accountability—the incumbency advantage—using data on nearly 10,000 mayoral elections in cities over the past 60 years. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that incumbency carries a substantial advantage for individual candidates. Moreover, I find that on-cycle elections provide incumbents with a far larger advantage than off-cycle elections do. These results show that election timing has important implications for electoral politics and demonstrate one possible mechanism for the prevalence of the incumbency advantage.