2012/10/16 by N. Perez, Natalia Pérez · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Art #Classics #Computer science #Law #Liberalism #Philosophy #Political science #Politics #Religion and Society Interactions #Religion, Theology, History, Judaism, Christianity #Religious Freedom and Discrimination #Religious studies #State (computer science) #Theology #Toleration
paper · doi:10.1093/jcs/css083
openalex publication_date 2012/10/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
The State of Israel … will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion.1 Religious toleration has been accepted as one of the most important liberal virtues going back to John Locke and has been discussed and defended by many liberal scholars since. Toleration, however, does not trump all other considerations, nor does it justify an expansive list of costly policies. Various liberal thinkers have argued that toleration vis-à-vis minority religious groups should not be extended in certain cases. Examples include cases in which the minority group oppresses its own members2 and when the minority norms impose, beyond a reasonable threshold, a costly burden on the overall society.3 Many liberal theorists agree that toleration can justify a policy of noninterference; some theorists allow a modest amount of actual support for liberal minority groups perhaps, but the argument does not extend further than that (see “Liberal Toleration section”). This article examines how the idea of liberal toleration applies to one controversial contemporary case: that of the legal arrangements in contemporary Israel toward the Ultra-Orthodox community.