2026/01/01 by Sebastian Rimestad
Social Sciences · #Religion and Society Interactions #Religious Tourism and Spaces #Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
paper · doi:10.1093/jcs/csag021
Abstract The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is not confined to the Russian Federation but encompasses numerous ecclesiastical structures outside of Russia. As a result of the ROC’s complicity in Putin’s war against Ukraine, most of these structures have experienced various forms of pressure from the political establishment and society at large to distance themselves from their mother church. These pressures have been most tangible in the three Baltic states, where the Orthodox Church is a daily reminder of the clash between a Soviet past and a European future. As members of NATO and the EU, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania aspire to be liberal Western countries, while they have relatively large Orthodox communities, consisting mainly of Soviet-era Russian-speaking migrants, for whom the church constitutes an important identity marker. The three countries have historically followed different political paths when it comes to regulating religious communities. Therefore, their response to the way the ROC has endorsed the war has differed. This article highlights the historical paths leading to the way each of the three Baltic States—both political establishment and media—has dealt with the existence of an Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate on their territory since February 2022. This includes political pressure as well as supporting elements within the churches critical of Moscow.