2007/01/29 by Jing Wang, Feng Fu, Wang, Jing +5
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Medicine · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Physical sciences #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.physics/0701315
openalex publication_date 2007/01/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies A, B and C in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model can be described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from a system of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the evolutionary process, we define two essential variables, the \em global and the \em local fixation probability. If the \em global fixation probability of strategy A exceeds the neutral fixation probability, the selection favors A replacing B or C no matter what the initial ratio of B to C is. Similarly, if the \em local fixation probability of A exceeds the neutral one, the selection favors A replacing B or C only in some appropriate initial ratios of B to C. Besides, using our model, the famous game with AllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed. Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT could invade the entire population under proper conditions.