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The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind.

1993/04/01 by D. M. Armstrong, John Foster · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Medieval and Classical Philosophy

paper · doi:10.2307/2186043

openalex publication_date 1993/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11

Abstract

Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self. John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current philosophical establishment. Ambitious and controversial, The Immaterial Self is the most powerful and effective defence of Cartesian dualism since Descartes' own

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