1972/06/01 by John Gimbel · 3 citations
Social Sciences · #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Eastern European Communism and Reforms
paper · doi:10.2307/2147827
openalex publication_date 1972/06/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23
Historians and analysts of many persuasions have used Secretary of State James F. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946, to explain U.S. policy in Germany, in Europe, and in the cold war with the Soviet Union. They generally agree that Byrnes formally renounced the hard-line policy for Germany, the more stringent provisions of directive 1067 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Morgenthau Plan. They agree that he called into question certain portions of the Potsdam Agreement and that he seemed unaffected by the spirit of retribution reflected in the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and in the actions of the immediate postwar occupation. They agree, also, that Bymes made important overtures to the Germans, including proposals for increased German self-rule and eventual self-government, for parallel relaxation of occupation controls, for gradual economic recovery under peaceful conditions, and for eventual acceptance of a peaceful, democratic Germany into the United Nations.'