2013/10/01 by Riley M. Moore · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Military History and Strategy #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.866423
openalex publication_date 2013/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2025/11/06
As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’