2007/05/11 by Roy Sorensen · 4 citations
Psychology · Arts and Humanities · #Deception detection and forensic psychology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00290.x
openalex publication_date 2007/05/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract: Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald‐faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald‐faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non‐deceptive false assertion: lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non‐deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion.