2020/11/29 by Johnson, Tim, Smirnov, Oleg
#91-08 #Applied Physics (physics.app-ph) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Biological sciences #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #FOS: Physical sciences #J.2 #J.3 #J.4 #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI) #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2011.14440
We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots. Cooperators evolve to fixation regularly in the model when we add time slots to lattices and small-world networks, and their portion of the population grows, albeit slowly, when organisms interact in a scale-free network. This selection for cooperators occurs across a wide variety of time slots and it does so even when a crucial condition for the evolution of cooperation on graphs is violated--namely, when the ratio of benefits to costs in the PD does not exceed the number of spatially-adjacent organisms.