2019/07/01 by Gonzalo Germán Núñez Erices · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Mathematics · Psychology · #Boundary (topology) #Classical Philosophy and Thought #Computer science #Epistemology #GRASP #Historical Linguistics and Language Studies #Linguistics #Mathematics #Mereology #Metaphysics #Modal #Object (grammar) #Philosophy #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Physics #Theoretical physics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1515/krt-2019-330203
openalex publication_date 2019/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Abstract The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish.