2006/01/01 by Alex Walter · 1 citation
Neuroscience · Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Philosophy and History of Science #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/147470490600400102
openalex publication_date 2006/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
The naturalistic fallacy and Hume's ‘law’ are frequently appealed to for the purpose of drawing limits around the scope of scientific inquiry into ethics and morality. These two objections are shown to be without force. Thus two highly influential obstacles are removed from naturalizing ethics. The relative merits of moral skepticism and moral realism are compared. Moral skepticism and some forms of moral realism are shown to make similar recommendations for developing a science of moral psychology.