2006/10/26 by William W. Ralph · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
paper · doi:10.1177/0968344506069971
openalex publication_date 2006/10/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/15
The area firebombing campaign waged against the cities of Japan in the waning months of the Second World War represented a stunning departure from early-war American bombing strategy. This policy evolved from the relationship between the USAAF commander, General Henry Arnold, and his subordinates in the field. Arnold had grown to trust a young field commander, Major General Curtis LeMay, so much that he sent him to bomb Japan with just one criterion -get results. Arnold needed these immediate, eye-catching results because they would provide benefits for the service well beyond simply beating Japan. There was little systematic and nothing pre-ordained about the course of the campaign, made possible because the most senior leaders abrogated their responsibility to oversee and perhaps check the incendiary campaign and the destruction and death that accompanied it.