2015/11/22 by Zach Weber, Guillermo Badía, Patrick Girard · 1 citation
Psychology · Computer Science · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Advanced Algebra and Logic
paper · doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1093010
openalex publication_date 2015/11/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/22
Do truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions.