Putting the prisoner's dilemma in context

2004/06/29 by L. A. Khodarinova, Khodarinova, L. A., James N. Webb +2
Decision Sciences · Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #math.OC #msc:91A22

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/0406597

11 pages, 4 figures

arxiv created 2004/06/29 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01

Abstract

The standard iterated prisoner's dilemma is an unrealistic model of social behaviour because it forces individuals to participate in the interaction. We analyse a model in which players have the option of ending their association. If the payoff for living alone is neither too high nor too low then the potential for cooperative behaviour is enhanced. For some parameter values it is also possible for a polymorphic population of defectors and conditional cooperators to be stable.

Citations

• Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics

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