2000/07/01 by Joseph P. McGarrity, Daniel Sutter · 17 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Biology #Control (management) #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Gun control #House of Representatives #Law #Management #Political science #Test (biology)
paper · doi:10.2307/1061612
published in Southern Economic Journal 67(1), 41 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2000/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether political action committees (PACs) make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long-term investments. Previous tests generally employ PAC contributions from only one cycle, which could impose the wrong structure on contracts between PACs and politicians, causing researchers to misestimate a contribution’s impact. We find that money from more than one election cycle influences roll call votes, which suggests that PAC expenditures are not simple spot market or one-period prepayment contracts. Most remarkably, we find that the National Rifle Association buys votes with contributions from three election cycles.