2012/01/01 by Seth Masket, Jonathan Winburn, Gerald Wright · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Competition (biology) #Computer science #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Law #Legislature #Polarization (electrochemistry) #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Redistricting #Social Policy and Reform Studies #State (computer science)
paper · doi:10.1017/s1049096511001703
openalex publication_date 2012/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract Redistricting received substantial attention in the popular media in 2011, as states redrew state legislative and congressional district boundaries. Many reformers continue to argue for a de-politicization of the redistricting process, claiming that partisan redistricting is responsible for declining electoral competition and increasing legislative polarization. Our analysis of evidence from state legislatures during the last decade suggests that the effects of partisan redistricting on competition and polarization are small, considerably more nuanced than reformers would suggest, and overwhelmed by other aspects of the political environment.