2022/01/27 by Aurélia Buchs, Nils Soguel · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Local Government Finance and Decentralization
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s11127-021-00949-z
openalex publication_date 2022/01/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract Using data from 225 cantonal government elections over the 1980–2019 period in Switzerland, we estimate the effect of fiscal performance on the vote share of finance ministers seeking re-election. Our estimations show that finance ministers benefit statistically and electorally from balancing fiscal accounts and presenting budget surpluses. Improving the fiscal balance by 1000 Swiss francs per inhabitant in the pre-election year raises the electoral result of a finance minister by 1.4–5.4 percentage points from the vote share of her previous election. We present evidence for politician-specific monitoring: the finance minister—in contrast to the spending ministers—seems to be the sole member of government who benefits, electorally, from debt reduction. Correcting for possible selection phenomena, our results suggest that the electoral effect of fiscal performance may not be caused by a selection bias but rather by the office of the finance ministry itself.