Epiphenomenalism

2010/02/05 by William S. Robinson · 1 citation
Psychology · Neuroscience · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Free Will and Agency #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

paper · doi:10.1002/wcs.19

openalex publication_date 2010/02/05 · openalex created_date 2022/05/12 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21

Abstract

Epiphenomenalists hold that mental properties are not reducible to neural properties and are not efficacious. The view and its motivations are explained for two kinds of mental properties. Objections, and replies on behalf of epiphenomenalism, are considered. While strict epiphenomenalism is a philosophical view, there are related views that have some empirical support. Examples of this work are discussed, and their relation to the strictly philosophical view is explained. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Citations

• Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
• Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions
• What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
• TIME OF CONSCIOUS INTENTION TO ACT IN RELATION TO ONSET OF CEREBRAL ACTIVITY (READINESS-POTENTIAL)
• On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History *
• Epiphenomenal Qualia

Cited by

• Epiphenomenalism [wikipedia]