Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

2016/03/09 by Aziz, Haris
#68Q15 #91A12 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #F.2 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #J.4

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1603.03073

Abstract

We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.

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