2014/08/31 by Nitin Jain, Birgit Stiller, Imran Khan +3 · 3 citations
Physics and Astronomy · #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1109/jstqe.2014.2365585
published as IEEE J. Sel. Topics Quantum Elect. 21, 3 (2015) · 11 pages, 7 figures, and author biographies (closer to the published version)
arxiv created 2014/12/19 · arxiv updated 2014/12/22
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD system if appropriate safeguards are not installed or if they can be fooled by Eve. We present a risk analysis of such attacks based on extensive spectral measurements, such as transmittance, reflectivity, and detection sensitivity of some critical components used in typical QKD systems. Our results indicate the existence of wavelength regimes where the attacker gains considerable advantage as compared to launching an attack at 1550 nm. We also propose countermeasures to reduce the risk of such attacks.