2013/11/27 by Charles Ci Wen Lim, Marcos Curty, Nino Walenta +2 · 4 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Algorithm #Channel (broadcasting) #Computer network #Computer science #Computer security #Decoy #Key (lock) #Physics #Quantum #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata #State (computer science) #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physreva.89.022307
published as Phys. Rev. A 89, 022307 (2014) · 5+3 pages and 2 figures
arxiv created 2013/11/27 · openalex publication_date 2014/02/10 · arxiv updated 2014/02/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible under real-world conditions. Crucially, however, the security and feasibility claims made by most of these experiments were obtained under the assumption that the eavesdropper is restricted to particular types of attacks or that the finite-key effects are neglected. Unfortunately, such assumptions are not possible to guarantee in practice. In this work, we provide concise and tight finite-key security bounds for practical decoy-state QKD that are valid against general attacks.