1988/01/01 by Jacob Rosen · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #African history and culture analysis #Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies #Middle East Politics and Society
paper · doi:10.1080/00263208808700729
openalex publication_date 1988/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/03
The declaration bearing Lord Balfour's name issued on behalf of His Majesty's Govemrnment on 2 November 1917 was the outcome of a process of vicissitudes and transformations in British policy towards Palestine. The declaration, which was regarded by the Zionist movement as the peak of Weizmann's activities during the war, has been wrapped over the years in myth and vagueness and only at the beginning of the 1960s were scholarly attempts made to penetrate toward its roots and to examine the real motives behind its publication.' These were attempts to lay bare what had transpired among British policy makers and what had moved them to issue the declaration. Their conclusion is that, with all due respect for Weizmann's efforts, the British embarked upon the Zionist path out of their own needs and not as a result of the efforts of the English Zionist Federation. These studies made an intensive and critical use of the vast material at the Public Record Office. Nevertheless, they have left some lacunae. Our purpose here is to attempt and fill in just one of them: the part played by Captain William Reginald Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) during 1914-18, who was first mentioned by Veret6. Veret6 crowns Mark Sykes as 'the architect of the government's Zionist policy' and Reginald Hall as one of the men who contributed to it by 'coming forward with suggestive notions'. Veret6 relies primarily on comments made by Hall on 12 January 1916 and which referred to the memorandum which Sykes and Picot had prepared following their discussions at the beginning of January 1916. Hall made severe criticism, and expressed doubts as to whether the agreement with France on the spheres of influence in Syria and Mesopotamia was necessary at that stage. He pointed out that France had no justification for claims in Palestine and that it was an error to ascribe to the Arabs 'a general desire for unity ... they will never be united'. England should secure for itself, in order to assure its position in Egypt, at least the exclusive control of all the railways in South Palestine. He expected Jewry's opposition to any scheme recognizing Arab independence and added that the Jews had a strong material and political interest in the future of Palestine. Thus, he suggested that in the Brown area the question of Zionism and also the British control of all Palestine railways, in the interest of Egypt, had to be considered.4 Though Veret6 notes that the memorandum was criticized by several experts in the British government, he focuses only on HaUl and does not explain or elaborate upon the criticism of the others. He does not explain Hall's primacy over the other critics. He only claims that Sykes referred to and perhaps even discussed with Hall the points the latter had raised, and