Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system

2012/03/07 by Shi‐Hai Sun, Shi-Hai Sun, Ming Gao +4 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #quant-ph

paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physreva.85.032304

published as Physical Review A 85, 032304 (2012) · 9pages,7figures

openalex publication_date 2012/03/07 · arxiv created 2013/05/26 · arxiv updated 2013/05/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Phase randomization is a very important assumption in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (QKD) system with a weak coherent source. Thus an active phase modulator is needed to randomize the phase of source. However, it is hard to check whether the phase of source is randomized totally or not in practical QKD systems. In this paper a partially random phase attack is proposed to exploit this imperfection. Our analysis shows that Eve can break the security of a two-way QKD system by using our attack, even if an active phase randomization is adopted by Alice. Furthermore, the numerical simulation shows that in some parameter regimes, our attack is immune to the one-decoy-state method.

Citations

• Ultra fast quantum key distribution over a 97 km installed telecom fiber with wavelength division multiplexing clock synchronization
• Determination of quasiprobability distributions in terms of probability distributions for the rotated quadrature phase
• Quantum cryptography using pulsed homodyne detection
• Quantum key distribution over 122 km of standard telecom fiber
• “Plug and play” systems for quantum cryptography
• Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication
• Noise in homodyne and heterodyne detection
• Practical Decoy State for Quantum Key Distribution

Cited by

• Single-photon-detection attack on the phase-coding continuous-variable quantum cryptography