Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC

2009/08/10 by Petra Gerlach‐Kristen · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Monetary Policy and Economic Impact #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Economic Policies and Impacts

paper · doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00248.x

openalex publication_date 2009/08/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21

Abstract

The monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Bank of England consists of five internal and four external members. We study the voting record and show that outsiders dissent more often than insiders and tend to prefer lower rates, especially during economic downturns. Moreover, dissents by outsiders help forecast future interest rate changes, in contrast to dissents by insiders. A model in which outsiders in contrast to insiders are “recession averse” and more uncertain regarding the appropriate level of interest rates replicates the observed voting pattern well.

Citations

• Nonlinear Taylor Rules and Asymmetric Preferences in Central Banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States

Cited by

• Anton Muscatelli [wikipedia]

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