2005/12/31 by Robert Koenig, Robert König, Renato Renner +2 · 5 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Adversary #Computer science #Computer security #Encryption #Information security #Information-theoretic security #Key (lock) #Key distribution #Physics #Property (philosophy) #Public-key cryptography #Quantum #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum cryptography #Quantum information #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Theoretical computer science #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.98.140502
published as Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 140502 (2007) · 5 pages; minor changes
arxiv created 2006/01/11 · openalex publication_date 2007/04/03 · arxiv updated 2011/11/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
The security of quantum key distribution is typically defined in terms of the mutual information between the distributed key S and the outcome of an optimal measurement applied to the adversary's system. We show that even if this so-called accessible information is small, the key S might not be secure enough to be used in applications such as one-time pad encryption. This flaw is due to a locking property of the accessible information: one additional (physical) bit of information can increase the accessible information by more than one bit.